ers" in Third World countries unconsciously propagate Christian values:
"not knowing what they are doing, they actually continue Christian missionary work."3 The most prominent contemporary representative of an essentialist "Western" understanding of human rights, however, is Huntington, the prophet of the danger of a "clash of civilizations." In his global political map, human rights-as well as democracy, liberalism, and political secularismbelong exclusively to Western civilization. 4 Huntington is convinced that universalism of human rights is bound to fail. For people from other civilizations, he says, the only way in which to have full access to human rights is to adopt essentially "Western" values and hence to implicitly convert to Western civilization.
The assumption that human rights are essentially a "Western" concept can lead to different practical consequences. Cultural relativists, such as Pollis and Schwab on the left and Huntington on the right, reject universal human rights as a manifestation of Eurocentric arrogance or as an illusion doomed to collapse. Other scholars, such as Fikentscher, seem to defend the idea that the West has a global mission to fulfill. Tibi even invokes Hegel's metaphor of a "cunning of reason" to argue that European colonialism, for all its injustice, might have yielded some positive results as well. Tibi writes, "It was, as it were, a byproduct of the European conquest of the world, a byproduct in the sense of the Hegelian 'cunning of reason,' that the European cultural heritage has been disseminated; and human rights constitute a crucial component of that heritage." 5 In opposition to essentialist "Western" claims of human rights, alternative conceptions meanwhile have been brought forward, conceptions that explicitly claim a non-Western cultural or religious origin. For example, Muslim authors or organizations have recently published a number of Islamic declarations of human rights that, in their own way, reflect the culturalism inherent in essentialist "Western" interpretations because these Islamic declarations, too, often claim an exclusive cultural and religious heritage of human rights. One of the earliest advocates of this new tendency is Mawdudi, an Islamist author from Pakistan, who vehemently attacks Western arrogance in the context of human rights. Alluding to the history of Western colonialism and imperialism, Mawdudi writes, "The people in the West have the habit of attributing every good thing to themselves and try to prove that it is because of them that the world got this blessing." Against human rights standards of the United Nations, which in Mawdudi's opinion were one-sidedly shaped by "Western" philosophy, Mawdudi drafts a specifically "Islamic" conception of human rights based primarily on the Qur'an and the tradition (Sunna) of the prophet Muhammad.
To divide the idea of human rights into "Western," "Islamic," and other culturally defined conceptions, however, would be the end of universal human rights. The language of human rights would thus simply be turned into a rhetorical weapon for intercultural competition. In this essay, I try to find a way out of the predicament of cultural relativism versus cultural imperialism. What is needed, in my opinion, is a critical defense of universal human rights in a way that gives room for different cultural and religious interpretations and, at the same time, avoids the pitfalls of cultural essentialism. In the first few sections (sections II to V), I investigate the relationship between human rights and what usually is called the "Western" tradition. I then turn to a discussion of different "Islamic" interpretations of human rights (sections VI to X). The article concludes with some remarks on human rights as the center of a cross-cultural "overlapping consensus" (section XI).
II. HUMANITARIAN MOTIFS IN EUROPEAN CULTURAL HISTORY
Human rights certainly did not develop in a cultural vacuum. Given that their historic breakthrough took place in North America and Westem Europe, there are good reasons to assume that the genesis of the idea of human rights can, in one way or another, be linked to the religious, philosophical, and cultural sources of the Occidental tradition. This tradition indeed provides a number of humanitarian, emancipatory, egalitarian, and universalistic motifs that might have helped to shape the modern principles of human rights.7 The fact that a multiplicity of such motifs can be identified should, at the same time, remind us that the Occidental tradition is merely an abstract conception covering different, and often antagonistic, currents and movements.
A religious and ethical motif that often has been called a main source of human rights in general is the Biblical idea that all human beings have equally been "created in the image of God" (Genesis 1:27) and thus have been endowed with an unalienable dignity. Referring to the special rank of the human person as an '"image of God," the Bible states that the shedding of human blood must be considered one of the gravest crimes (Genesis 9:6). In Psalm 8 the singer, overwhelmed and struck down by the magnificence of creation, turns to God wondering, "What is man, that thou art mindful of him? And the son of man, that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him little lower than the angels and hast crowned him with glory and honour. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet" (Psalm 8:4-6). In the New Testament the principle of equality before God supersedes social and ethnic difference. Thus St. Paul emphasizes, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28). Comparable ideas of a spiritual unity of all of humanity also occur outside the Jewish-Christian holy scriptures, for example, in the writings of Stoic philosophers. The Roman emperor Aurelius, one of the most prominent Stoic authors, teaches that the human spirit emerges from divinity. He further points out that all human beings intimately belong together. They constitute one family united not by physical bonds of blood and seed but primarily by their common participation in the divine logos.8
Jewish-Christian as well as Stoic and other motifs have jointly formed the European natural law tradition that stretches from antiquity to modernity. The concept of natural law has different connotations. On one hand, the natural law tradition claims an unconditional authority of some basic normative principles that are supposed to be prior to human legislation and in this sense "natural" as opposed to merely artificial. Sophocles' Antigone provides an early example of such a conviction by invoking "unwritten laws" of eternal validity. On the other hand, the concept of natural law also connotes independence from an exclusively theocratic foundation of society and law. In this context, normative principles are thought to be "natural" in the sense of being understandable without explicit reference to a divine revelation and thus applicable to people outside of the dominant (i.e., Christian) religious tradition as well. Under this assumption, Bartolome de Las Casas, a member of the Dominican order, became an ardent defender of the "natural rights" of non-Christian Indians in South America. He charged the European conquistadores with murder, robbery, and genocide, that is, brutal crimes that violate the natural law.9 The natural law tradition therefore often has been listed as one of the most important sources of human rights in Western tradition.
Other scholars have located the historic origin of human rights in the Protestant Reformation, an event that Hegel praises as the very birth of modernity and modern freedom. In his philosophy of history, he writes that the Reformation is the banner of the free spirit around which the modern nations assemble."' Three generations after Hegel, Jellinek (1895) and Troeltsch (191 1) argued that the Protestant emphasis on the individual free conscience as a precondition of authentic faith paved the way historically for the recognition of individual human rights.'" Important steps toward human rights also can be seen in the "Petition of Right" of 1628 and the "Habeas Corpus Act" of 1679. One of the contributions of the British common law tradition, it has been argued, is the insight that rights require remedies in order to be effective because "where there is no remedy, there is no right.""2
III. HUMAN RIGHTS: NO "NATURAL" RESULT OF THE OCCIDENTAL TRADITION
It would be easy to add more examples of traditional humanitarian motifs that have been linked to the development of human rights. It would be problematic, however, to claim that these and similar motifs of the Occidental tradition represent immediate historic precursors of the modern idea of human rights. Strictly speaking, these motifs are not "sources" or "roots" from which human rights developed more or less naturally. The use of teleological metaphors such as "source" and "root" harbors the danger of cultural essentialism. The problem is that, from a cultural-essentialist perspective, human rights seem to be rooted in the "cultural genes" of a particular culture or religion that itself thus seems to be entitled to claim the achievement of human rights as an exclusive legacy. The Indian philosopher Kaviraj criticizes such an essentialist attitude toward human rights with the following words:
While the idea of subjects as bearers of rights existed in a sketchy fashion in premodern history of Europe, these ideas were developed by a specific historical trajectory to produce the modern conception of a civil society and civic rights. Indeed, one danger of reading this too deep into the European past is that this encourages essentialist thinking. Achievement of a civil society then gets associated with a mysterious and indefinable feature of European culture or "Western spirit," which proves before the debate has begun that it is beyond the cultural means of other societies to create similar institutions. 13 On closer investigation, it becomes evident that the humanitarian motifs mentioned earlier cannot be identified as premodern equivalents of modern human rights. It is well known, for example, that the Biblical idea of every person representing an "image of God" did not go along with demands of equality before the law. Although St. Paul emphasizes spiritual equality between free man and slave, he never criticizes slavery in social reality but instead advises, "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called" (1 Corinthians 7:20). Paul even sends back the runaway slave Onesimus to his master Philemon."4 Similarly, Aurelius, for all his stress on ethical unity of all men within the human family, does not challenge slavery as such. He praises the modesty of his father by saying that he never paid attention to "the comeliness of his slaves." '5 Thomas Aquinas vindicates slavery as a consequence of Adam and Eve's original sin. Even in paradise, however, Aquinas thinks that human beings would have lived in relationships of political domination and subordination. Legal inequality, in his opinion, not only is a feature of the "postlapsarian" natural law (i.e., the situation after the fall of man) but also belongs to the pre-lapsarian immaculate divine order. 6 In medieval cosmology, inequality, including inequality among human beings in their social and legal status, constitutes the very beauty of the hierarchical order of things. It is clear that in the framework of such a hierarchical worldview, human rights, in the modern sense of rights of equal freedom and participation, are inconceivable from the outset. This hierarchical understanding of creation even affects the medieval meaning of human dignity. It is indeed noteworthy that in medieval philosophy the term "dignity" is mostly used in the plural, thus indicating the different dignities of people in accordance with their different ranks, order, and estates in a feudal society.
One also should avoid overstating the impact of the Protestant Reformation on the historical development of human rights. To be sure, the Reformation marks a turning point in theological reasoning by challenging the clerical hierarchy of the Middle Ages. Luther's emphasis on the spiritual freedom of every Christian and the spiritual equality of all believers, however, was not meant to call into question the given social and political order. On the contrary, Luther was anxious not to conflate spiritual liberation with political and legal demands because such a conflation, he feared, would amount to a new legalism that would undermine the liberating theological message of the gospel. Hence if there is any connection between the Reformation and modern human rights, then it must be an indirect one. Troeltsch indeed emphasizes that it was not mainstream Protestantism but rather the "stepchildren of the Reformation" (i.e., individual dissenters and marginalized Protestant denominations) who paved the way for the adoption of religious liberty in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 17 Finally, the English common law tradition does not immediately lead to human rights either. The principal witness in this regard is Burke, who plays off traditional rights of Englishmen against the purportedly abstract universal rights as they were propagated by the French Revolution. Referring to the 1628 "Petition of Right," Burke points out that in the English tradition, rights were considered a particular heritage to be passed on from generation to generation:
In the famous law of the [third year] of Charles I, called the Petition of Right, the parliament says to the king, "Your subjects have inherited this freedom," claiming their franchises not on abstract principles "as the rights of men" but as the rights of Englishmen and as a patrimony derived from their forefathers. 18 Burke's argument is that rights of freedom never can be created artificially on the basis of universal equality but rather must be cherished as a particular historic legacy within a particular nation, as a partnership among "those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." '9 Burke's polemic against the French Revolution is an early example of the critique of human rights. Not less than the idea of human rights itself, such a critique also is part of Western history. In the wake of Burke, Joseqh de Maistre ironically professes that he never has seen the subject of human rights, namely, man as such.20 Similarly, Hegel, in his critique of the French Revolution, vehemently attacks the "abstractness of liberalism."2' From a left-wing Hegelian point of view, Marx argues that the 1789 French declaration merely propagates the rights of an isolated and selfish individual. "The human right of freedom is not based on the community of man with man, it is based on the separation of man from man. It is the right of separation, i.e., the right of an individual completely confined to himself."22 Schmitt, a right-wing Hegelian lawyer, also perceives human rights as a manifestation of a bourgeois ideology that undermines communitarian solidarity. Historically linked to a merely private individual morality and to a liberal economy, individual human rights, he says, are an element of disintegration: "all these elements of disintegration clearly aim at subordinating state and politics either to an individualistic and private morality or to the primacy of economic calculation."23 At times, even Arendt seems to join the critics of human rights. Referring to the situation in refugee camps after the two world wars, she points out that people want to be recognized as members of their particular cultural and political communities rather than as abstract human beings. 24 Conservative criticism of human rights used to be a widespread attitude among the Christian churches in Western and Central Europe. Traumatized by anti-clerical radicalism in the Jacobine phase of the French Revolution, the Catholic Church played, for more than a century, the role of the most influential opponent to human rights in general and to religious liberty in par- The term "posttraditional" rightly indicates that normative justification under the circumstances of modernity cannot be achieved simply by conjuring up traditional authorities. And yet the term is misleading because it can nourish the idea that posttraditional human rights require a rupture from all tradition. This, however, would be a problematic assumption. If human rights were to imply an abstract dichotomy between tradition and modernity, then those who continue to cherish their religious or cultural traditions would be conceptionally excluded from having full access to human rights. In other words, the acceptance of human rights, at least in principle, would be confined to a circle of people who implicitly or explicitly have broken away from their religious, philosophical, or cultural traditions. One also should be aware of the hermeneutic standpoint from which we look at history. Connecting human rights to humanitarian elements within religious, philosophical, or cultural tradition is possible only from the standpoint of modernity. It is from a modern standpoint that we can discover traditional humanitarian motifs that allow building a bridge between the present and the past. It is in retrospective that we see an analogy between modern ideas of human dignity and the Biblical message of the person being an image of God. By looking back into the past, we can trace the genesis of the rule of law to the 1215 "Magna Charta" and other medieval or ancient documents. In retrospective it also might make sense to compare modern principles of freedom and equality to Luther's doctrine of the free religious conscience and the spiritual equality of all believers before God. And it is even possible to connect retrospectively secular human rights to aspects of a disenchantment of the cosmos that can be found already in the Bible. Generally speaking, hermeneutic awareness should teach us that the previously mentioned traditional ideas are not "roots" or "sources" that harbor the potential of modern human rights, a potential that gradually ripened in history. It is the other way around in that the modern idea of human rights characterizes the standpoint from which we can retrospectively discover humanitarian motives that facilitate a critical reconstruction of aspects of continuity between the present and the past.
In such a hermeneutical retrospective, not only aspects of continuity but also experiences of discontinuity and change should be taken into consideration. Down to the present day, the Christian churches have a tendency not to pay sufficient attention to the changes they had to undergo to be able to endorse human rights and religious liberty. Rather than ignoring or harmonizing traditional conflicts, however, it would be more appropriate to acknowledge the fact that the recognition of human rights on the part of the churches is the result of a complicated and lengthy learning process.33 A self-critical reflection of this learning process, including all the misunderstandings, polemics, and reforms inevitably involved in such a process, would provide an excellent basis for interreligious and intercultural dialogue on human rights.
V THE EUROPEAN HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN EXAMPLE
Back to the initial question: are human rights "a Western construct with limited applicability," to quote Pollis and Schwab? Obviously, the answer depends on what we understand by the "Western origin" of human rights. I have argued that human rights are neither a natural result of European culture and history nor completely disconnected from the Occidental tradition. On one hand, the idea of human rights is not "Western" in the emphatic sense of the word as if this idea were deeply rooted in the genes of the Occidental culture at large. On the other hand, the endorsement of human rights does not require us to abandon tradition altogether and to take a "posttraditional" standpoint, a standpoint from which "the West" would be merely a geographical term without any cultural meaning. Rather, the "Western origin" of human rights means the simple fact that the idea of universal rights of freedom and equality, so far as we know, was first proclaimed in Western Europe and North America. By investigating this historic fact more closely, we can discover various factors-political, economic, cultural, and religious-that in one way or another might have helped to foster the development of human rights. These factors, undoubtedly, also include important currents of the philosophical and religious tradition in the West. One should bear in mind, however, that the historic breakthrough of human rights took place at a time when the traditional European society was in a deep crisis, a crisis triggered by the split of European Christendom in the wake of the Reformation as well as by decades of civil wars between conflicting religious and political factions. Crisis of tradition does not necessarily mean a decline or even a loss of tradition. What it does imply, however, is a serious transformation of tradition. Experiences of structural injustice-civil wars, religious intolerance, arbitrary detentions, and other acts of state oppression-demonstrated the urgency of far-reaching political and cultural reforms. Thus people gradually learned how to achieve peaceful coexistence and cooperation in a modem pluralist society on the basis of equal freedom and participation, that is, in the normative framework of human rights and democracy.
The modem awareness of freedom has its ethical core in the profession of human dignity. Understanding human dignity in Kantian terms as moral autonomy and connecting this autonomy to universal rights of freedom and participation certainly is a specifically modern achievement.34 For all the novelty of universal human rights, however, the underlying profession of dignity can at the same time be meaningfully connected to the Bible, to Stoic philosophy, and to other founding documents of what we usually call the Western tradition. Although human rights cannot simply be derived from this tradition in a deductivist or essentialist way, they certainly are not "posttraditional" in the sense that all connection between modern rights conceptions and traditional ethical principles must be severed.
Two systematic insights can be gained from looking at the European history of human rights, insights that can be helpful for a cross-cultural normative dialogue. On one hand, European history shows that people fighting for their basic rights often faced a lot of resistance. This resistance not only was a political one but also included cultural and religious opposition epitomized, for example, by the Christian churches that, over a considerable period of time, were quite reluctant to support modern principles of political emancipation. On the other hand, European history also shows that a critical reconciliation between modernity and tradition was possible, a reconciliation that today clearly includes the churches, meanwhile often ardent advocates of human rights.
The history of human rights in the West is not a binding "model" that allows us to make forecasts about the prospects of human rights in other parts of the world, nor should this Western history be covered by a "veil of ignorance" on behalf of a purportedly neutral standpoint in cross-cultural debates. Rather, the history of human rights in the West gives us an example-not the paradigm per se but merely an example-of the various obstacles, misunderstandings, learning processes, achievements, and failures in the long-lasting struggle for human rights. Such a self-critical historic perspective may enhance our sensitivity for the problems and opportunities, be they different or similar, that human rights advocates are facing in "non-Western" cultural contexts as well.
Perhaps even more important, a self-critical attitude of Europeans and North Americans toward their own complex and complicated history of human rights also is a necessary precondition for overcoming the suspicion, on the part of many people, that by fighting for human rights "Westerners" simply try to impose their own cultural values and norms in an imperialistic fashion. This suspicion is widespread in Muslim countries whose populations historically suffered from European colonialism and, in many cases, still feel threatened by Western imperialism. In the face of such widespread mistrust, it seems all the more important to make it clear that human rights do not constitute a set of essentially Western values that are to be exported on a global scale. Rather, what underlies human rights is experiences of structural injustice culminating in those "barbarous acts" that, as the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" of 1948 emphasizes in its preamble, "have outraged the conscience of mankind."35 Taking seriously this fundamental experience requires us to embark on a common learning process toward establishing efficient human rights mechanisms, a learning process in which claims of cultural legacies should cease to play a dominant political role.
Vl CONFLICTS BETWEEN SHARIAH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
It is a trivial observation that religion constitutes merely one component within a whole range of political, economic, social, and cultural factors that inhibit or foster the implementation of human rights. When it comes to Islamic countries, however, this truism seems worth recalling because Islamic religion and culture often are portrayed as being the chief obstacle to an improvement of the troubling human rights situation in some of these countries. Against such a one-sided view, Faath and Mattes point out that most of the human rights violations that they have analyzed in North Africa do not show specifically "Islamic" features: 36 On the other hand, one can hardly deny that the relationship between Islam and human rights is complicated and raises a number of problems. These problems do not derive from Islam per se but have to do with the Islamic shariah, or more precisely, with traditional or fundamentalist interpretations of the shariah by which the latter is rendered a comprehensive sys-tem of politically enforcible normative regulations. Given the fact that the basic features of the shariah developed in the first centuries of Islamic history,37 whereas the historical breakthrough of human rights was roughly a millennium later, differences and conflicts between these two normative systems can be no surprise. Concrete conflicts center primarily around questions of gender equality and religious liberty. Although acknowledging women's legal personality, the traditional shariah did not include the principle of equality in rights for men and women. It is especially in matters of marriage, family life, divorce, and inheritance that differences in legal standing between the genders have persisted to the present day. Measured against the benchmark of modern human rights, they must be regarded as discriminating against women. to its divine origin, provides an absolute foundation for protecting the rights and duties of every human being. An early example of this tendency is the booklet, Human Rights in Islam, written by Mawdudi. While adopting modern rights language, Mawdudi never addresses critically the previously mentioned conflicts between shariah and human rights. Moreover, his section on "Equality of Human Beings" reveals a rather restricted understanding of equality. Whereas Mawdudi rejects "all distinctions based on colour, race, language, or nationality,"42 his list of criteria of nondiscrimination does not include gender and religion, the two main issues over which traditional shariah and modern human rights collide. Mawdudi's approach, after all, leads to a superficial and uncritical "Islamization" of human rights, that is, an ideological conception that certainly is not less essentialist than are essentialist "Western" or "Christian" readings of human rights. The widespread tendency in Western concepts of human rights to claim that these rights have their "roots" in the Occidental tradition can thus analogously be found in essentialist Islamic interpretations that trace human rights back to Qur'an and Sunna.
A radical example of an essentialist Islamic occupation of the concept of human rights was given by some Iranian participants of the fourth GermanIranian conference on human rights, which took place in November 1994 in Tehran. 43 At the opening of the conference, the Ayatollah Taskhiri from the holy city of Ghom presented a conservative Islamic conception of human rights from which he drew the conclusion that a full understanding of these rights must be reserved to faithful Muslims. In his exclusivist and dogmatic approach, the ayatollah compromised even the idea of universal human dignity by distinguishing between a "potential" and an "actual" dignity. Assuming that all human beings are called on to lead a virtuous life well pleasing to God, all humans, he said, are "potentially" equal in their human dignity. However, it was clear to Taskhiri that he who fulfills his duty faithfully ultimately can claim a higher degree of "actual" dignity than he who fails to meet the religious standard, let alone he who refuses to accept his divine vocation altogether. This is to say that such a dogmatic type of reference to a divine foundation of human dignity leads to a concept of dignity that, in sharp contradiction to article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, serves as a vindication of human inequality rather than justifying universal equality of all human beings in dignity and freedom.
Such a tendency of an essentialist "Islamization" of human rights meanwhile has found expression in a number of semi-official documents on human rights issued by various Islamic organizations. 44 
VIII. PRAGMATIC REFORMS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SHARIAH
If conservative Muslims frequently are reluctant to undertake an open criticism of the traditional shariah, this does not mean that changes toward modern human rights are completely excluded. From early on, Islamic scholars had to face the problem that legal norms and institutions of non-Islamic origin played a role, sometimes an important one, in Muslim societies. To deal with this situation, legal elements of non-Islamic origin had to be integrated into the overarching framework of the shariah, for example, by referring to some general principles such as that of common welfare (maslaha). Whatever seemed to be useful for society could thus be justified as being in accordance with, and indeed part of, the shariah. At the same time, those elements of the shariah whose implementation could lead to undesired consequences were suspended pragmatically. It was argued that a full and thorough implementation of the shariah could be enacted only under ideal circumstances as it was the case in the original Muslim community of Medina. As Schacht observes, "As long as the sacred law received formal recognition as a religious ideal, it did not insist on being fully applied in practice."49 Thus except for some "puritan" shariah schools, flexible interpretation and pragmatic application of the normative rules always have accommodated moderate reforms. As a result, within most shariah schools, a tradition of humanitarian pragmatism has developed that facilitates a mediation between the validity claims based on religious revelation and the practical necessities of daily life. The Qur'an itself seems to justify this attitude given that Sura 2:185 emphasizes, "God intends every facility for you; he does not want to put you to difficulties." The humanitarian pragmatism that is typical of large currents within Islam today also permits taking steps toward a gradual reconciliation with modern ideas of freedom and equality, even though the conceptual differences between shariah and human rights might yet remain unsettled.
With regard to amputation penalties, for example, many Muslims refer to a precedent enacted by the second caliph Omar, who is said to have suspended amputation for theft in times of starvation.50 From this precedent, even conservative Muslims often conclude that such cruel forms of corporal punishment should not be applied in practice unless and until a perfectly just 
IX. CRITICAL RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE SHARIAH
Although the possibilities of pragmatic reforms within the framework of the shariah should be taken into consideration, one also should be aware of the limits of such a pragmatic approach. So long as the superiority of the shariah as a divine and inalterable set of legal norms is unchallenged in theory, the legitimacy of human rights remains precarious. Either human rights suffer from the failure of not being considered legitimate in the full sense of the word, or the danger arises that conceptual differences between shariah law and human rights are simply harmonized with the result of an "Islamized" version of human rights.
Liberal Muslim intellectuals therefore do not content themselves with suggesting merely pragmatic reforms. What they demand is a courageous and frank criticism of the Islamic shariah, a criticism that, although not necessarily calling for the dismembering of the shariah tradition, is meant to lead to a thoroughly revised understanding of the main sources of the shariah, namely, Qur'an and Sunna. Liberal reformers argue that by means of such a critical examination, the shariah can be liberated from the bulk of medieval legal casuistry that, in the course of time, has unjustifiably overshadowed the essential normative message of Qur'an and Sunna. 9 With regard to Qur'an and Sunna, Rahman points to the progressive tendencies embodied in the original normative guidance of Islam, tendencies that later have been lost to a large degree. What is therefore needed, he argues, is not blind or passive submission to given legalistic rules but instead an active and responsible type of obedience that tries to capture the deeper meaning of the Qur'anic principles and apply them to the ever changing needs and circumstances of human society. Rahman writes, Whereas the spirit of the Qur'anic legislation exhibits an obvious direction towards the progressive embodiment of the fundamental human values of freedom and responsibility in fresh legislation, nevertheless the actual legislation of the Qur'an had partly to accept the then existing society as a term of reference. This clearly means that the actual legislation of the Qur' an cannot have been meant to be literally eternal by the Qur' an itself.60 Some reformers go a step further by calling into question the mainly juridical connotations of the shariah. Ashmawy, a well-known Egyptian judge, points out that the term "shariah" etymologically does not mean "law" or "jurisprudence"; it originally means something like "the path to the source in the desert," which is a metaphor for religious and ethical guidance in the broadest sense.61 Ashmawy therefore insists that the shariah not be equated with traditional jurisprudence (fiqh), as often happens. He even accuses those who blur the line between revelatory guidance and historic jurisprudence of coming close to polytheism because they dilute the uniqueness of divine revelation by mixing it with the results of human legislation and human jurisprudence.62 By distinguishing clearly between shariah and fiqh, the body of norms that usually has been called "Islamic law" can be analyzed as a result of human history with all its contingencies. This opens up the conceptual space for historic criticism as well as political reforms in accordance with democratic principles and modern standards of human rights.
Liberal Muslims further argue that the principles of human rights and democracy can be connected meaningfully with the spirit of the shariah, provided that the shariah is primarily understood as an ethical and a religious concept rather than as a legalistic one. The Qur'an, which is the main source of the shariah, repeatedly emphasizes the dignity of the human person. According to Sura 2:30, God has called on Adam to act as his deputy (khalifa) on earth, thus giving him a special rank above all other creatures. God even commands that the angels bow down before man (Sura 2:34). Along a similar line, Sura 17:70 emphasizes that God has honored the children of Adam. Sura 33:72 tells the story that when God, at the very beginning of time, offered a divine trust (amana) to the heavens, the earth, and the mountains, they all shrank back from accepting it because they were frightened by this offer. By contrast, man, although being frail and vulnerable, proved courageous enough to take on the divine trust voluntarily, thus showing himself superior 63 to the most mighty things of nature including heaven and earth. Hassan, an Islamic feminist, reads these and other verses of the Qur'an as an Islamic foundation of the dignity of every person as "an end in itself," as she puts it * * ~~~~64 using Kantian terms.
A very courageous and, at the same time, highly controversial interpretation of the Qur'an has been proposed by the Sudanese scholar An-Na'im. Taking up a method developed by his teacher Taha, An-Na'im distinguishes systematically between suras revealed in Mecca and suras revealed in Medina. This difference always has been acknowledged in Islamic exegesis. What is new in An-Na'im's approach, however, is that he understands the two stages of revelation as entailing a theological ranking: whereas the suras of the Mecca period contain the eternal theological message of Islam, the Medina parts of the Qur' an refer mostly to the specific needs and circumstances of the first Muslim community and cannot be immediately applied to modern society.65 Although An-Na'im does not deny the divine character of the Qur'an in its entirety, he introduces a criterion by which he can distinguish between different degrees of validity within the Qur'an itself. Whereas, in An-Na'im's opinion, some Qur'anic principles are indeed of timeless validity, others contain rules that can be appreciated as examples of an Islamic way of life within a particular historic context without being immediately binding for Muslims today. In such a way, An-Na'im wants to develop a modern version of Islamic law that is to be in accordance with international standards of human rights.
An-Na'im is not the only contemporary Muslim scholar who calls for a new hermeneutic approach to reading the Qur'an, although there are few who share his specific methodology.66 Rahman, for example, criticizes the common exegesis of the Qur'an as "piecemeal, ad hoc, and often quite extrin sic."67 Making use of modern hermeneutics to achieve a more subtle understanding of the text is therefore an urgent need. Othman, a representative of the Malaysian "Sisters in Islam" (a liberal Islamic nongovernmental organization committed to promoting women's rights), points to the difference between the time of revelation and the present day, a difference that always must be taken into consideration for an appropriate understanding of the Qur'anic text to be possible. She writes,
We in the present have to read those texts in order to understand them at all; but in seeking to understand them, we-like all Muslims throughout history-bring to our own reading of those past texts the frameworks of understanding of our own time and place. We hear the past voices that speak to us speaking with contemporary accents, as it were-our own. So we are always, like all the great ulama of the past-even if they were not aware of it-both reading the present back into the past from which we seek contemporary guidance and also left with the problem ... of deciding how we are now to implement or proceed upon that understanding.68
The awareness of historic distance, Othman argues, is a way in which to do justice to the Qur'anic text. At the same time, this hermeneutic awareness helps to fight the temptation to simply "apply" purportedly timeless Qur'anic principles to the different circumstances of a society as we enter the twentyfirst century.
The Egyptian professor Abu Zaid thinks along similar lines. The purpose of his proposal of a new hermeneutics is to recapture critically the guiding principles of the Qur'an out of those many historical details that belong to the circumstances of revelation but do not constitute the essential message of the Qur'an. In this way, he wants to bring to new life the spirit of justice that, in his opinion, lies at the core of the Qur'anic ethical principles. Among other things, Abu Zaid calls for reforms in the field of Islamic inheritance law because he thinks that the general tendency of Qur'anic justice is to foster equality among all human beings. What matters for Abu Zaid is that the Qur'an endows women with dignity and respect, thus giving them a legal standing that they did not enjoy in pre-Islamic times. However, concrete details, such as the difference between men and women in their heritage claims, should be seen as a historically contextualized application of this general tendency. These historic details should therefore not prevent modern Muslims from going further in the general direction ofjustice and equality as demanded by the Qur'an. 69 A decidedly feminist reading of the Qur'an has been proposed by Hassan. She refers primarily to the strict monotheistic creed that constitutes the theological center of Islam. In the light of the Islamic warning that the transcendence of the divine creator must never be amalgamated with his creation, Hassan argues that the invocation of God as a pretext to legitimize earthly power relations must be rejected as a violation of Islam. In particular, she attacks the traditional hierarchy between the genders that often has provided the husband with almost a quasi-divine authority. According to Hassan, this religious justification of social authority borders on blasphemy. She thus points out sarcastically, The husband, in fact, is regarded as his wife's gateway to heaven or hell and the arbiter of her final destiny. That such an idea can exist within the framework of Islam-which totally rejects the idea of redemption, of any intermediary between a believer and the Creator-represents both a profound irony and a great tragedy.70
Hassan's argumentation demonstrates that the Islamic doctrine of strict monotheism, a doctrine from which fundamentalist authors such as Mawdudi derive authoritarian political consequences, also can be understood in an emancipatory sense in that monotheism provides a theological basis for challenging absolute power relations among human beings.
It also is with reference to the monotheistic creed that Talbi, a Tunesian scholar and committed human rights advocate, calls for a full implementation of religious liberty, beyond the limits of traditional Islamic tolerance. He is convinced that respect for the inscrutable divine will implies respect for one's fellow human beings' inner convictions, for no one can pretend to know God's plan with the individual person. Talbi During all his life, the Prophet made no allusion to anything which could be called an "Islamic state" or an "Arab state." It would be blasphemy to think otherwise. The Prophet did not leave this earth until he had entirely accomplished the mission given him by God and had explained to his nation the precepts of religion in their entirety without leaving anything vague or equivocal. 75 Abdarraziq further argues that the caliphs' pretension of religious authority, culminating in the title of "God's shadow on earth," amounts to idolatry, which is one of the gravest sins in Islam. Hence his conclusion that the end of the caliphate, far from being a religious disaster, can indeed be appreciated as a liberation of Islam: "Muslims are free to demolish this worn-out system (of the caliphate) before which they have debased and humiliated themselves. The real alternative is not one between divine law ... and human law. It is the alternative between two versions of human law, one of which admits frankly to be human whereas the other version pretends to speak in the name of divine revelation. This latter version of human law is dangerous because it tends to base its particular positions on divine law, thus attributing to its passions and errors a sacredness and infallibility to which it has no title. 79 In contrast to such an ideological occupation of divine law, political secularism tries to do justice to the finite nature of human beings. At the same time, political secularism can be understood as an expression of respect for the transcendence of the one God whose inscrutable will must never be instrumentalized for the purposes of power politics.
Xl. CONCLUSION. TOWARD A CROSS-CULTURAL "OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS" ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Both in Western and in Islamic countries, human rights have become a matter of debate and controversy. The multiplicity of positions voiced in this debate range from liberalism to conservatism, from libertarianism to socialism, and from theocratic claims to outspoken secular ideas. Hence there is no such thing as the Western or the Islamic conception of human rights. Historic analysis indeed shows that human rights always have been a political issue, not the natural result of any "organic" development based on the genes of a particular culture. Therefore any cultural essentialist occupation, such as an "Occidentalization" or an "Islamization" of human rights, should be rejected.
The rejection of cultural essentialism, however, does not imply that cultural aspects become altogether meaningless. On the contrary, culture and religion can be, and indeed often are, powerful motives of practical commitment on behalf of human rights, motives that deserve to be recognized historically and to be cherished politically. Hence the question of how we can maintain the connection between human rights and religious or cultural tradition without getting trapped in the culturalist fallacy.
What I would like to suggest is that we understand human rights as the center of a cross-cultural "overlapping consensus" on basic normative standards in our increasingly multicultural societies. It is well known that the term "overlapping consensus" was coined by Rawls.i0 What Rawls wants to clarify by introducing this concept is the complex relationship between the guiding idea of political justice in a modern liberal society, on one hand, and the multiplicity of religious or philosophical convictions held by the members of that society, on the other. Although Rawls's considerations neither refer to international issues nor cover questions of multiculturalism, some of his insights also may be helpful for an analysis of international human rights in a cross-cultural perspective. I take up three aspects from Rawls and apply them briefly to the topic of human rights: (1) the genuinely normative and critical claims of political justice, (2) the limited scope of political justice as compared to "comprehensive" worldviews, and (3) the possibility of appreciating political justice from different religious or philosophical perspectives.
1. Rawls repeatedly emphasizes that his concept of political justice goes beyond a mere modus vivendi; that is, it must be more than just a compromise between all those normative convictions that happen to exist in a given society. The liberal principles of political justice embody genuinely normative substance and thus are bound to collide, for example, with authoritarian values or racist political programs. In such a conflict, the principles of political justice claim a practical priority over competing values and convictions. The Rawlsian "overlapping consensus" is thus not merely a descriptive concept; it poses a critical challenge. What is at stake is not a factual consensus but rather a normative consensus in the sense that people holding different convictions should nevertheless be enabled to agree on some basic principles of justice so as to shape their coexistence and cooperation on the basis of equality and freedom. The "overlapping consensus" is an ideal for a pluralistic modern society, not a description of the status quo. On one hand, it opens up the conceptual space for a plurality of different world views, ideologies, religions, philosophical doctrines, and so on. On the other hand, the "overlapping consensus" also defines limits of political tolerance in a liberal society. 81 Similarly, universal human rights have a critical normative force in that they are designed to lead to a political and legal order based on equal freedom and participation. Constituting a morally demanding conception, human rights are not from the outset compatible with all religious or philosophical doctrines or with all cultural ways of life. Howard is right in saying, "A culture and community based on systematic degradation must be challenged; if individual rights threaten such as society, so much the better. Human rights may sometimes require cultural rupture."82 No society, culture, or religion can claim to comply with human rights unless it is willing to undertake political and intellectual reforms. It is no coincidence, for example, that the recognition of human rights on the part of the Catholic Church went along with far-reaching doctrinal changes including the renunciation of the traditional concept of state religion. Similarly, it seems clear that to achieve a critical reconciliation between human rights and Islamic tradition, reforms toward recognizing equal rights between the genders must be put on the agenda. And there can be no doubt that universal human rights and a traditional caste society do not fit together. In short, an "overlapping consensus" on human rights must go beyond the smallest common denominator between the existing traditional values of different cultures." Human rights are a normatively challenging conception in that they call for changes, self-criticism, and reforms to foster the mutual recognition of human beings on the basis of equality.
2. To not overstate the normative claims of human rights, however, it is worth noting that their normative scope is limited. This is the second aspect I would like to take up from Rawls. To put it in his language, the idea of politi-cal justice is not a "comprehensive doctrine" but instead focuses on "the basic structure of society."84 The political and legal institutions underlying society might well be basic, yet they can hardly be called an all-encompassing Weltanschauung.
The same holds true for human rights. While constituting political and legal standards, they do not entail a comprehensive guidance as to how to lead one's life both as an individual and within one's community. Human rights do not give any answers to the existential questions of the meaning of life and death. And they do not provide rituals and symbols through which people can express their mutual respect and appreciation beyond the sphere of politics and law. In short, human rights are neither a "comprehensive doctrine" nor a comprehensive ethical code of conduct. They cannot compete with cultural and religious traditions, although they do exercise a critical effect on the interpretation and development of these traditions.
The focus of human rights is on political and legal justice. Although the emancipatory spirit of human rights certainly poses a challenge to authoritarian traditions, a multiplicity of religious or nonreligious worldviews, individual and communitarian ways of life, and an abundance of different cultural expressions are possible. Human rights do not constitute an allencompassing "global ethics" or a globally binding "civil religion." Commitment on behalf of international human rights therefore should not be perceived or propagated as a modern form of missionary work, let alone as a new version of the Crusades. The idea of an "overlapping consensus" on human rights does not even require us to work for a worldwide ecumenical reconciliation between all religions and ideologies because people are free to define their (individual and communitarian) identities against each other, provided they respect universal equality in human dignity and rights.
3. Rawls points out that, although his idea of political justice is not a "comprehensive doctrine," it is, on the other hand, not simply disconnected from more comprehensive worldviews. He argues that the guiding idea of political justice can be meaningfully appreciated from the perspectives of various philosophical or religious doctrines. The same holds true for human rights. It is especially the idea of human dignity that can connect human rights with different religious, philosophical, and cultural traditions because the insight into the unalienable dignity of every human being constitutes both the basic ethical principle of human rights and a central element of the teachings of various religions and philosophies. The "Project on Religion and Human Rights," based in New York, has come to the conclusion that "there are elements in virtually all religious traditions that support peace, tolerance, freedom of conscience, dignity and equality of persons, and social justice.?85 One should be anxious, however, to make sure that the appreciation of human rights from the standpoint of different religious or cultural traditions does not lead to forms of an essentialist occupation. It would be immediately problematic to "base" human rights on the Bible, the Qur'an, the holy scriptures of the Hindus, or the teachings of Confucius, for as a result of such deductivist and essentialist approaches, the idea of universal human rights would easily get lost in a variety of competing religious and cultural conceptions. What I have emphasized in this essay with regard to the "Western" tradition therefore applies to other traditions as well: one always should be aware of the hermeneutic problem that it is only in retrospective that we can build a bridge between modern human rights and the sources of religious or cultural tradition. Such a hermeneutical awareness is the best way in which to fight essentialist appropriations of human rights by which their inherent universalism would be swallowed up by competing claims of particular cultural legacies.
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